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OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
A citizen's advocacy group, "For Our Children's
Ultimate Safety" ("FOCUS"), and two of the group's members,
Jacqueline Colville and Catherine Silvio (collectively, the
"plaintiffs"), appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting a motion
to dismiss their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Family
Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and a
judge of that court.

Their claim arises out of gag orders

entered during a celebrated child custody case, In re Byron
Griffin, No. 1608-92 (Pa. C.P. filed Aug. 21, 1992) (the "Baby
Byron" case), currently pending before the court of common pleas.
The gag orders prohibited the parties to that case from
discussing the case with the public.

FOCUS (but not the

individual plaintiffs) attempted to intervene in the Baby Byron
case, arguing that the gag orders violated its rights under the
First Amendment.
In a quick series of events, (1) the court of common
pleas rebuffed FOCUS' attempt to intervene, (2) the Pennsylvania

Superior Court refused to entertain FOCUS' motion for a writ of
mandamus, and (3) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied FOCUS'
petition to exercise its King's Bench jurisdiction to declare the
gag orders unconstitutional.

FOCUS then joined forces with the

two individual plaintiffs and filed this § 1983 suit in federal
district court, alleging that the state court and its judge
violated their First Amendment rights.

The district court

dismissed all claims against the state court on Eleventh
Amendment grounds.

It then dismissed the claims against the

judge, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and also that it should abstain
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The plaintiffs appeal only the district court's RookerFeldman and Younger rulings.

The plaintiffs do not appeal the

district court's decision to dismiss their claims against the
state court on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

We hold that neither

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor Younger bars the plaintiffs'
federal challenge to the judge's gag orders, and we will
accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.
FOCUS is a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania unincorporated
association consisting of some fifty birth and foster parents
whose goal is to make the Allegheny County Children and Youth
Services ("CYS") more accountable, accessible and understandable.
One of FOCUS' activities is to acquire information about the
operations, policies and practices of CYS by listening to and

advising individuals affected by the agency's activities.

FOCUS

has been interested in the highly-publicized1 Baby Byron case, a
child dependency and adoption proceeding which involves a dispute
between white foster parents and the biological mother over the
placement of two young black children.
FOCUS claims that its attempts to keep informed about
the Baby Byron case have been hampered by several gag orders. The
first order, issued on January 24, 1994, states:
[I]t is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
that the parties and their counsel and others
having knowledge or information whatsoever
regarding this case are prohibited from
releasing any such knowledge or information,
in whole or in part, to the media or
otherwise.
(App. at 16.)

The second gag order, issued on November 1, 1994,

directs that:
[The] parties are to have no contact with the
public vis a vis discussing or referring to
this case in any public context or forum.
(App. at 18.)

The judge reaffirmed the second order on November

14, 1994, and it remains in effect today.
The parties to the Baby Byron case have not challenged
the gag orders.

The plaintiffs allege that this is because the

judge has threatened to deny custody of the child to any party
that publicly discusses the case.

The plaintiffs further allege

that the child's foster parents, Karen and Michael Derzack,
"recently released a book detailing their experiences with Byron
1

E.g., Alyssa Gabbay, Baby Byron Case Illustrates Black-andWhite Issue of Adoption, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1995, at A22
(stating that the case has focused national attention on the
issue of transracial adoption and has inspired nationwide media
coverage, a book, legislation, and a recent motion picture).

and their frustration with CYS and the courts," thus indicating
that the Derzacks were willing to talk at some point prior to the
entry of the gag orders.

(App. at 9.)

On November 14, 1994, FOCUS (without Colville and
Silvio) moved to intervene in the Baby Byron case for the limited
purpose of challenging the gag orders on free speech grounds. The
judge's tipstaff informed FOCUS that the judge would not accept
FOCUS' intervention motion and that FOCUS would not be permitted
to present argument in opposition to the gag orders. FOCUS claims
that the judge refused even to accept the motion to intervene so
that he would not have to deny it formally.
FOCUS immediately filed an "Emergency Petition For a
Writ of Mandamus" with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
seeking an order compelling the judge to permit FOCUS to
intervene in the Baby Byron case and to participate in that
afternoon's scheduled hearing.

The superior court immediately

denied that motion for lack of jurisdiction.
FOCUS responded on November 16, 1994, by filing a
"Petition For Extraordinary Relief And Request For Expedited
Decision" with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking to invoke
the court's extraordinary "King's Bench" jurisdiction pursuant to
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 502, 726.

Unlike the Emergency

Petition to permit intervention, however, FOCUS asked the court
to issue an order declaring the gag orders unconstitutional.
supreme court denied the Petition for Extraordinary Relief on
December 12, 1994 without explanation.

The

On December 19, 1994, FOCUS joined with individual
plaintiffs Silvio and Colville to file their verified complaint
and motion for a temporary restraining order in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The

defendants moved to dismiss the next day for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

On December 22, 1994, the district court

held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and granted it for the
reasons stated above.

This timely appeal followed.

II.
The parties do not raise the issue but, before we can
proceed further on the merits, we must satisfy ourselves that the
plaintiffs have standing to present their free speech challenges
to the gag orders.

E.g., Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 n.1

(3d Cir.) (considering standing issue sua sponte and noting that
the courts of appeals have an independent obligation to ensure
that federal jurisdiction is present in cases coming before
them), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 473 (1992).

"The party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing" the
elements of standing, and "each element must be supported in the
same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation."
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

Lujan v.

Thus, "when

standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we 'accept
as true all material allegations in the complaint, and . . .
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.'"

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
The standing issue arises in this case because the gag
orders merely constrain the speech of the parties and the
attorneys to the Baby Byron case; the plaintiffs do not complain
that the orders affirmatively constrain their speech in any way.2
Of course, that alone does not mean the plaintiffs' case fails
for lack of standing.

"We have routinely found, as have other

courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective
orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access
to information or judicial proceedings."

Pansy v. Borough of

Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted);
see also In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir.)
(noting the rights of potential recipients of speech to challenge
the abridgment of that speech), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946
(1988).
That putative recipients of speech usually have
standing to challenge orders silencing would-be speakers does not
necessarily mean that the plaintiffs in this case have standing,
however.

The plaintiffs still must show that the gag orders have

caused them injury in fact and that their injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.

See, e.g., United States v.

Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (setting forth the three

2

The first order does speak to "others having knowledge or
information regarding this case." The plaintiffs do not claim
that this order restrains their own speech, however. Instead,
they complain that the gag orders restrain the speech of the Baby
Byron parties and their lawyers.

elements necessary to satisfy "the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing").
Accordingly, courts have found that third parties have
standing to challenge a gag order only when there is reason to
believe that the individual subject to the gag order is willing
to speak and is being restrained from doing so.

E.g., In re Dow

Jones, 842 F.2d at 607 (determining whether the recipients have
standing required the court first to examine "[w]hether the
[plaintiff] news agencies are actually potential receivers of
otherwise restrained speech"); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 n.12 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that
the third party had standing to challenge a protective order
because "far from agreeing to the protective order, the
plaintiffs to this action have opposed the protective order at
every stage" and the speech, therefore, would be available);
Radio & Television News Ass'n v. District Court, 781 F.2d 1443,
1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the press lacks standing to
assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject
to the gag order has not challenged it).
Our cases are consistent with this view.

In Pansy, for

example, we employed an "available material" approach when we
inquired into the practical effect of vacating the order of
confidentiality at issue in that case; we noted that the
plaintiff newspapers "ha[d] an interest in vacating the Order of
Confidentiality" because they then could obtain the required
information through Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act.
784.

23 F.3d at

Similarly, in United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845

(3d Cir. 1978), we held that the intervening newsgathering
organizations and reporters had standing to challenge the
district court's order excluding the public from a pretrial
suppression hearing and sealing the record of that hearing.
There, speech was in fact going on and was thus "available," but
the challenged order denied the intervenors the right to receive
it.
Looking at the allegations in the verified complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs here, there are
reasons to conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately met a
"willingness of the speaker" requirement for standing at this
stage of the litigation.

As we have noted, while neither party

to the Baby Byron case is on the record as being opposed to the
gag orders, the Derzacks at least were willing to talk at some
point prior to the entry of the gag orders; The complaint alleges
that the Derzacks "recently released a book detailing their
experiences with Byron and their frustration with CYS and the
courts."

(App. at 9.)

Moreover, the complaint further alleges

that the judge "has threatened to remove Byron from the Derzack's
[sic] home if the Derzacks appear publicly to promote their book
or otherwise discuss their case."

(App. at 10.)

It is

reasonable to infer from these allegations that the Derzacks are
willing but restrained speakers who dare not challenge the gag
orders for fear of reprisal from the judge.

At this stage, we

must accept these allegations and this permissible inference in
the plaintiffs' favor.

In sum, we find that the plaintiffs have alleged facts
in their verified complaint which would be sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
proceed to entertain this appeal.

It follows that we may

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs

upon remand still bear the burden of proving standing whenever it
is challenged.

See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911

F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[A] court's refusal to dismiss an
action for lack of standing does not relieve the plaintiff of the
burden of actually proving standing where a defendant contests
the factual basis for standing."), rev'd on other grounds, 504
U.S. 555 (1992).

The plaintiffs must prove that the Baby Byron

parties are willing to talk publicly about that case.

If the

district court, at any point, concludes to the contrary on the
basis of an appropriate record, then it should proceed no
further.3

III.
We exercise plenary review over an order granting a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d
256, 264 (3d Cir. 1991).

3

Because the district court dismissed

The district court may choose to address the standing issue in
a pre-trial proceeding or at trial. See Doherty v. Rutgers Sch.
of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 898 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1981); 13A
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.15,
at 97-104 (1984 & Supp. 1995). Regardless of the procedure
chosen ultimately to determine this issue, however, our decision
here finding standing based on the allegations of the complaint
neither forecloses the district court from reexamining the issue
nor absolves the plaintiffs from carrying their burden of proof.

the complaint before the defendants filed an answer, we review
whether the complaint alleges facts on its face which, if taken
as true, would be sufficient to invoke the district court's
jurisdiction.

Licata v. United States Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259,

260 (3d Cir. 1994).
The district court ruled that the plaintiffs' suit was
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine provides that "federal district courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's
highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are
'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a
judicial proceeding.'"

Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d

Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)); see
also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

We have

interpreted the doctrine to encompass final decisions of lower
state courts.

Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass'n v. Port Auth., 973

F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992).

We have also concluded that

"Rooker-Feldman does not bar individual constitutional claims by
persons not parties to earlier state court litigation . . . ."
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992).
When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in a federal
court, the existence of a state court judgment in another case
bars the federal proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when
entertaining the federal court claim would be the equivalent of
an appellate review of that order.

For that reason, Rooker-

Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff

the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the
state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action
that would render that judgment ineffectual.

Marks v. Stinson,

19 F.3d 873, 886 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding Rooker-Feldman
inapplicable where "the district court could (and did) find that
[the plaintiffs'] constitutional claims had merit without also
finding that the [state] court erred").

As the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals wrote recently:
A federal district court has jurisdiction
over general constitutional challenges if
these claims are not inextricably intertwined
with the claims asserted in state court. A
claim is inextricably intertwined if the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent
that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it. In other words, RookerFeldman precludes a federal action if the
relief requested in the federal action would
effectively reverse the state decision or
void its ruling. Accordingly, to determine
whether Rooker-Feldman bars [plaintiff's]
federal suit requires determining exactly
what the state court held . . . . If the
relief requested in the federal action
requires determining that the state court
decision is wrong or would void the state
court's ruling, then the issues are
inextricably intertwined and the district
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the suit.
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.
1995) (citations omitted).
Three state courts were involved in FOCUS' attempts to
lift the gag orders issued in the Baby Byron case: the Family
Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

No one claims that the superior court's refusal to hear the
plaintiffs' claim was an "adjudication" of FOCUS' First Amendment
claim for Rooker-Feldman purposes.

Instead, the defendants

concentrate on the common pleas and the supreme court decisions,
arguing that they were "adjudications" which were "inextricably
intertwined" with FOCUS' First Amendment claims for the purposes
of Rooker-Feldman.

We address each of those decisions in turn.

The judge allegedly took two actions in the common
pleas proceeding: (1) his initial decision to issue the gag
orders and (2) his thwarting of FOCUS' attempt to intervene.
first set of decisions can be dealt with quickly.

The

None of the

plaintiffs was a party at the time the judge issued the original
gag orders.

As a result, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not

have barred the plaintiffs--once the gag orders issued
--from proceeding straight to federal court to challenge their
constitutionality.

Valenti, 962 F.2d at 298.4

The plaintiffs argue that the judge's thwarting of
FOCUS' attempt to intervene should not be viewed as an
adjudication.

While one could debate whether his tipstaff's

refusal to accept the motion is an adjudication, we think there
is a far easier way to resolve the matter.

The crucial issue is

not whether the action itself is "adjudicative."
4

Instead, the

The defendants argue that Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiffs'
federal claims in part because the First Amendment issues were
"inextricably intertwined" with the judge's gag order decisions.
That is correct inasmuch as the parties to the Baby Byron case
could not bring a First Amendment case in federal court
challenging the gag orders.
Under Valenti, however, RookerFeldman does not prohibit third parties--such as plaintiffs
here--from challenging a state court gag order in federal court.

issue is (1) whether the judge adjudicated FOCUS' First Amendment
claim and, if not, (2) whether his decision (if any) is
inextricably intertwined with FOCUS' First Amendment claim.
The judge did not decide FOCUS' constitutional
challenge to the gag orders or any other issue that is a
predicate to the claim in the federal proceeding.

In short, we

have no reason to believe that in order for FOCUS to prevail in
federal court, the court must decide "that the state court
decision [on intervention] is wrong."
983.

Charchenko, 47 F.3d at

In this respect, this situation is indistinguishable from

the one we faced in Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994).
In that case, some of the plaintiffs had filed petitions with the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas asking relief on the basis of
fraud and alleged constitutional violations in connection with an
election.

The court refused to entertain their claims asserting

that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

We held that a subsequent

proceeding in the district court was not barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine:
[T]he court was not barred under RookerFeldman from hearing the constitutional and
fraud claims of Marks and the Republican
State Committee ("RSC") because these claims
had not been determined by the state court,
nor were they inextricably intertwined with a
prior state court decision. Specifically,
the court of common pleas dismissed Marks'
and the RSC's claims without reaching the
merits. Therefore, the district court was
not faced with a situation where it was asked
to review a determination of the state court.
. . . Here, the district court could (and
did) find that Marks' and the RSC's fraud and
constitutional claims had merit without also
finding that the court of common pleas erred
when it dismissed their proceedings.

Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d at 886 n.11.
Thus, had FOCUS stopped its state court activity at
that point and filed this suit in federal district court, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not have barred it from challenging
the constitutionality of the gag orders in federal court.
Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision bars
FOCUS' federal case presents a similar issue.

FOCUS' motion

before the supreme court was filed as a "Petition For
Extraordinary Relief And Request For Expedited Decision."

It

asked the supreme court to:
a.
Assume [King's Bench] jurisdiction over the herein
matter pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§502 and 726, and
Pa. Const. Art. V, §10(a);
b.

Shorten the time to three (3) days for the filing
of answers to the herein petition;

c.

Issue forthwith an order declaring the gag orders
to be an unconstitutional restraint of speech;

d.

Issue forthwith an order vacating the gag orders;
and

e.

Award such other relief as is just and
appropriate.

(App. at 68-69.)

By order of December 12, 1994, the supreme

court denied that petition without giving any reason.
Once again, we conclude that a federal court
determining the constitutionality of the gag orders would not
need to conclude that the state court's decision was erroneous.
Nor would it be required to invalidate in any way the state
court's dispositive order.

The King's Bench jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has been characterized by that court as "our
extraordinary jurisdiction"--a discretionary jurisdiction to "be
invoked sparingly, and only in cases 'involving an issue of
immediate public importance.'"

Washington County Comm'rs v.

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 417 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1980)
(quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 726).

As the court explained

in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425, 430
n.11 (Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979):
[T]he presence of an issue of immediate
public importance is not alone sufficient to
justify extraordinary relief. As in requests
for writs of prohibition and mandamus, we
will not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction
unless the record clearly demonstrates a
petitioner's rights. Even a clear showing
that a petitioner is aggrieved does not
assure that this Court will exercise its
discretion to grant the requested relief. See
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's order of December 12,
1994, is consistent with an exercised discretion on its part not
to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction.

Its failure even to

comment on the constitutional issue strongly suggests that this
was the basis for its disposition.

It is sufficient for present

purposes, however, to note that nothing in the record of the
proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmatively indicates that it adjudicated the First Amendment
issue that the plaintiffs have presented to the district court in
this case.

Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is
unsuccessfully invoked and the court does not expressly
adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the general rule is that
there is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is free
subsequently to pursue his claim in any appropriate forum.

E.g.,

Hiley v. United States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).

While we have found no case of the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania directly on point, we are confident
that it would give its December 12th order no claim preclusive
effect.

Accordingly, we are not bound to give it claim

preclusive effect.
While this does not directly answer the Rooker-Feldman
issue presented by the December 12th order, we think it points
the way.

As we have previously noted, "the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine has a close affinity to the principles embodied in the
legal concepts of claim and issue preclusion."
at 297.

Valenti, 962 F.2d

Moreover, because the December 12th order did not affect

the legal relationship before the parties and did not preclude
further proceedings on the constitutional issue tendered, it is
clear that the district court in this case is not being asked
here to play the role of a reviewing court.

Not only is the

district court being asked to adjudicate an issue distinct from
any the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly adjudicated, it
is also being asked to grant relief that is entirely consistent
with the existence of the December 12th order.

For these reasons, we conclude that this issue is
governed by the principles set forth in Marks v. Stinson, even
though the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, unlike the court of
common pleas in Marks, declined to give a reason for its
disposition.

Accordingly, we hold that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine presents no bar to the plaintiffs' federal court
action.5

IV.
The district court also held that it should abstain
from asserting jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).

We exercise plenary review over the legal determinations

of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met
and, if so, we review the district court's decision to abstain
for abuse of discretion.

O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785,

790 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1355 (1995).
Three requirements must be met before Younger
abstention is appropriate: (1) there must be an ongoing state
judicial proceeding to which the federal plaintiff is a party and
with which the federal proceeding will interfere, (2) the state

5

The individual plaintiffs have an additional argument
supporting their view that Rooker-Feldman does not bar their
federal court challenges. As we have stated, "Rooker-Feldman
does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not
parties to earlier state court litigation . . . ." Valenti, 962
F.2d at 298. Drawing an analogy to concepts of claim preclusion
and issue preclusion, however, in this particular case we would
group the individual plaintiffs together with FOCUS for both
Younger and Rooker-Feldman purposes. Cf. 18 Charles A. Wright et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4456, at 491-92 (1981 & Supp.
1995).

proceedings must implicate important state interests, and (3) the
state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise
the constitutional claims.

Port Auth., 973 F.2d at 173.

conclude that the first requirement is not present here.

We
The

judge's refusal to accept or to rule upon FOCUS' motion to
intervene means that FOCUS was never a party in state court--and
there was no ongoing case for Younger purposes--until FOCUS filed
its King's Bench petition in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Since that proceeding had been terminated without an adjudication
of the constitutional issue at the time of the filing of the
federal complaint, Younger abstention was improper.
The parties agree that the Baby Byron case is
"ongoing."

Still, while the Baby Byron case is ongoing in the

usual sense, it is not "ongoing" for Younger purposes because
FOCUS has never been allowed to intervene and cannot there secure
an adjudication of its constitutional claim.

The defendants

acknowledge, as they must, that FOCUS never became a party to the
custody hearings.

The best they can do is to argue that FOCUS

tried to become a party and that this should suffice for Younger
purposes.

While the defendants grant that FOCUS cannot secure an

adjudication of its First Amendment claim from the court of
common pleas with the state case in its present posture, they
propose a rule that any party who attempts unsuccessfully to
intervene in a state proceeding may not seek federal relief
unless and until she has exhausted any possibility of overturning
the decision on intervention.

This would include, in the

defendants' view, filing a King's Bench petition seeking an order
permitting intervention.
We find no basis for implying a duty to exhaust all
available state process in pursuit of intervention and,
accordingly, see no reason why FOCUS, once rejected by the court
of common pleas, was not free to seek relief immediately from a
federal court.

Our observations in Marks about Younger

abstention are equally applicable here:
[I]t is . . . important to recognize that a
person with a federal Civil Rights Act claim
has no duty to exhaust state remedies before
pursuing his or her claim in the federal
courts. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).
Younger principles must be applied in a
manner consistent with this well-established
proposition. As we noted in Monaghan v.
Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1986),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 484 U.S.
193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988),
"in no case has the Supreme Court or this
court ever turned the propriety of a Younger
dismissal upon the mere availability of a
state judicial proceeding." Thus, the

plaintiffs in this proceeding could have
proceeded in federal court without having
resorted to the state's judicial process.
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.2d at 882.
These principles were recently applied by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a context very similar to that
presented here.

In Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.

1995), the plaintiffs were two anti-abortion demonstrators and a
journalist who reports on anti-abortion demonstrations.

They

brought a § 1983 declaratory action seeking relief from a
Wisconsin state court injunction limiting the anti-abortion
activities of several named state court defendants "and all
persons acting in concert with them."

The federal plaintiffs

were not parties to the ongoing suit in which the injunction had
been entered but alleged that they wished to protest abortions at
the clinics named in the injunction (or in the case of the
journalist to write about such protests) and that they were
deterred from engaging in First Amendment protected activity by a
well-grounded fear that the injunction would be interpreted as
prohibiting their activity on pain of criminal contempt.

The

defendants in the federal proceeding raised Younger abstention as
a bar to relief, asserting that "the plaintiffs should have
intervened in the state court injunction proceeding and then they
could have gotten the adjudication they want, in the state
courts."

47 F.3d at 848.

The Court of Appeals held that there

was no duty to intervene, observing that "nothing in Younger or
the cases following it suggests that persons claiming a violation
of their federal rights have an obligation before turning to

federal court to see whether there is some state court proceeding
they might join in order to present their federal claims there."
Id.
If a would-be federal plaintiff in a civil rights
action has no duty to attempt to intervene in an ongoing state
suit in which he might be able to tender his constitutional
issue, it follows, we believe, that FOCUS, once rejected by the
court that entered the gag order, had no duty to exhaust all
extraordinary state remedies in an attempt to intervene.

The

Younger doctrine is based on comity and the notion that comity
makes it undesirable to permit a party access to a federal court
when he is currently involved in state proceedings where he can
secure an adjudication of his constitutional claim.

We believe

FOCUS has done everything that considerations of comity can
reasonably require of it.

It could have gone directly to federal

court without seeking to intervene.

Consistent with

considerations of comity, however, it afforded the court of
common pleas an opportunity to adjudicate its constitutional
challenge but was rebuffed without a ruling on that challenge.
The interests of comity would be ill served, we believe, were we
to hold that FOCUS by so acting in the service of comity had
erected substantial barriers to its federal court access.

We

decline to so hold.
Because there is no ongoing state proceeding in which
FOCUS can secure an adjudication of its constitutional claim, we
hold that Younger abstention was inappropriate.

V.
Finally, citing Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.
1995), the defendants assert "basic principles of equity" as
alternative grounds for affirming the district court.

As we have

explained, in Hoover potential anti-abortion protestors and a
journalist--none of whom were named defendants in the state court
action--sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
state court injunction on the ground that the order violated
their rights under the First Amendment.

After first finding

Younger inapplicable, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal because the remedy sought was unworkable.
The court reasoned:
[The plaintiffs] want the federal court to
tell the state judge to rewrite his
injunction to make it clearer, to refrain
from convicting anybody who does not really
and truly violate the injunction as revised,
and to tell the police chief and the judge
not to infer that people are assisting in
violating the injunction from their mere
proximity to defendants named in the
injunction. The relief that the plaintiffs
seek is at once an insult to the judicial and
law enforcement officials of Wisconsin, an
interference with an ongoing state court
proceeding, and an empty but potentially
mischievous command to these officials to
avoid committing any errors in the
enforcement of the [state court] injunction
. . . .
. . . The plaintiffs' able counsel,
when pressed at oral argument, was unable to
suggest a useful amendment to the injunction
and acknowledged that what he really wants
from the federal courts is a firm warning to
Wisconsin officialdom that they are not to
trample on his clients' constitutional
rights. . . . [T]he difficulty of framing a
useful injunction, when considered in
conjunction with the affront to comity that

such an injunction would constitute and the
nebulous and speculative character of the
fears that have led the plaintiffs to sue,
convinces us that this suit is an
inappropriate invocation of the equity powers
of the federal courts.
Id. at 850-51.
Hoover is inapposite.

The plaintiffs in Hoover did not

claim that the state court injunction as written violated their
First Amendment rights; they asserted only that it was capable of
being applied in a manner that violated those rights.

They were

asking the federal court to warn the state court and police
officials to enforce the injunction in a constitutional way.

The

plaintiffs here, on the other hand, complain that the gag orders
can only be applied in ways that infringe on their First
Amendment rights to receive information from willing speakers who
will not speak solely because of those orders.

While the

district court may be confronted with a difficult merits issue
when it attempts to reconcile First Amendment interests with
Pennsylvania's interest in confidentiality for family court
proceedings, there is no reason to believe that it will have any
greater difficulty in fashioning an effective remedy than in any
other § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of state
action.

Thus, we cannot say that "this suit is an inappropriate

invocation of the equity powers of the federal courts."
851.

VI.

Id. at

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district
court's order granting the motion to dismiss and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

